


Shimon, Einstein, Ph.D.,  
 clinical psychologist,  
 clinical lecturer, radio  
 host, consultant, and  
 organizer. He has published  
 and served as  
*International Journal  
 Substance Use &  
 Abuse*, *Altered States of  
 Consciousness*, *Violence  
 and Aggression* &  
*Journal of Pharmacology*



of the monograph series, *The Use and Misuse of  
 Drugs*, creator of The Middle Eastern Summer  
 School - Jerusalem, Israel, creator and co-director  
 of the European Institute - Rome, Italy and recipient of  
 the Nobel Award.

Professor **Menachem Amir** received his Ph.D.  
 at the University of Pennsylvania. He is a  
 member of the permanent faculty of the Institute  
 of Criminology, at the Hebrew University,  
 Jerusalem, Israel, and has served as its director.  
 Amir specializes in, and writes about, the mafia,  
 juvenile delinquency and victimology, and is  
 currently concentrating his work on organized  
 crime—national and international, research for  
 the Israeli government in the areas of police  
 violence, community policing and undercover  
 police work. He has been a consultant for various  
 Ministerial Committees, has published widely,  
 is a member of the editorial boards of: *Violence  
 and Terrorism* and *The International Journal of the  
 Use and Misuse of Drugs*. His most recent book is  
*Police Violence Patterns and Issues*. Professor Amir  
 has lectured at universities throughout the world (Sweden,  
 Canada, USA, South Africa, and The Netherlands).  
 He received the prestigious Israel Prize in 2003 for his life-time  
 contributions to the field of criminology.


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**Police Corruption:  
 Paradigms, Models and Concepts -  
 Challenges for Developing Countries**





S. Einstein and M. Amir



**Police Corruption:  
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 Challenges for Developing Countries**



Professor **Stanley (Shlomo) Einstein**, Ph.D., is a clinical and social psychologist, researcher, academician, lecturer, radio interviewer, journalist, consultant, and conference organizer. He has published 20 books, created and served as chief editor of *The International Journal of the Addictions (Substance Use & Misuse)*; *Drug Forum; Altered States of Consciousness; Violence, Aggression & Terrorism*; and *Social Pharmacology* and is the creator of the monograph series, *The Use and Misuse of Drugs and Uncertainty*, creator of The Middle Eastern Summer Institute on Drug Use - Jerusalem, Israel, creator and co-director of The Mediterranean Institute - Rome, Italy and recipient of the NIDA Pacesetter Award.



Professor **Menachem Amir** received his Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania. He is a member of the permanent faculty of the Institute of Criminology, at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, and has served as its director. Amir specializes in, and writes about, the mafia, juvenile delinquency and victimology, and is currently concentrating his work on organized crime—national and international; research for the Israeli government in the areas of police violence, community policing and undercover police work. He has been a consultant for various Israeli government Ministerial Committees, has published widely and has served as a member of the editorial boards of: *Violence, Aggression and Terrorism* and *The International Journal of the Addictions (Substance Use and Misuse)*. His most recent book is *Force and Control: Police Violence Patterns and Issues*. Professor Amir lectured at various universities throughout the world (Sweden, Finland, Australia, Canada, USA, South Africa, and The Netherlands). He was awarded the prestigious Israel Prize in 2003 for his life-time contributions in the field of criminology.



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## Police Corruption: Paradigms, Models and Concepts— Challenges for Developing Countries

S. Einstein and M. Amir



### Resources on the Internet

Since Greek is "Greek" to most people, access to material and information concerning Greece is greatly hindered. Links to agencies and organizations related directly or indirectly with the study and management of corruption and with the police can be found below.



The Greek Ombudsman  
Independent Authority

[http://www.synigoros.gr/en\\_index.htm](http://www.synigoros.gr/en_index.htm)



Hellenic Data Protection Authority

[http://www.dpa.gr/home\\_eng.htm](http://www.dpa.gr/home_eng.htm)



The Prime Minister's Office

[http://www.primeminister.gr/index\\_en.htm](http://www.primeminister.gr/index_en.htm)



Ministry of Public Order [in Greek]

<http://www.ydt.gr/index.htm>



Ministry of Justice [in Greek]

<http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/>



Hellenic Parliament

<http://www.parliament.gr/english/organwsh/default.htm>



Transparency International – Greece  
Organisation against Corruption [in Greek]

<http://www.transparency.gr/>

## 16 Policing Problems in Turkey: Processes, Issues and the Future

Ali Caglar\*

### Abstract

*The main aim of this chapter is to investigate, explain, and discuss the major problems in the Turkish Police. To achieve the aim, firstly, a general introduction on police organization and policing in Turkey is given. The necessary, secondly, problems and corruption in policing are explained and discussed from two foci: In this part, the subject is discussed on two bases: organizational-based-problems and corruption and officer-based-problems and corruption. Finally, a general evaluation is done and future perspectives are pointed out. Semi-structured interview and secondary data techniques are used to collect the data needed.*

**Key Words:** accountability, corruption, discretion, officer-based-problems, organization-based-problems, police, policing, transparency, Turkish Police

### Introduction

This is necessary, because in order to understand policing problems well, one needs to know Turkey's police organization, its structure and policing applications. Otherwise, it will not be possible to analyze the existing problems or corruption and to point out the main structural problems. Secondly, the policing problems and corruption in Turkey are explained and discussed from two foci: organizational-based problems and corruption and individual officer-based problems and corruption. Finally, a general evaluation is presented and future perspectives are noted. The data on the subject were mainly collected by using semi-structured interviews and secondary data techniques. Interviews were carried out with 10 officers of different ranks, ranging from ordinary police officer to director of security. It is important to note that at the beginning they did not really collaborate or cooperate. Initially, both senior and ordinary police officers denied that there was any corruption in policing. In the course of the in-depth interviewing, they adopted a somewhat relaxed attitude and started talking more informatively on the issue, especially when reference was made to significant press stories. But none of those police interviewed would let the researcher record the conversation. The researcher was left with the option of only taking notes. The secondary data were derived from a variety of different sources such as articles, newspapers, MA theses and Ph.D. dissertations. All were analyzed and used in order to achieve this study's aims.

\* Associate Professor, Hacettepe University, Department of Public Administration, 06532 Beytepe, Ankara/TURKEY. E-mail: [acaglar@hacettepe.edu.tr](mailto:acaglar@hacettepe.edu.tr)



Although the literature review documents that there are many studies on police, policing and related issues in other societies, particularly in Western societies, the police, unfortunately, are one of the least studied subjects in Turkish social science literature. That is, there is a paucity of research on police and policing in Turkey. This not only limits efforts to deepen our understanding, but also leaves us no basis for comparison. On the other hand, this situation gives an opportunity to do a pioneering study on this subject in the Turkish Police.

### The Police and Policing in Turkey

In the development of the modern State, the people comprising a nation became the sole source from which the State could derive its legitimacy, and the nation became the sole legitimate object of their political allegiance (Bittner, 1980:123). Nationalism in this sense was associated with the redrawing of the territorial map of the new Turkish Republic. This new nation State embodied two distinct ideas of sovereignty: sovereignty as the idea of the State's supreme and independent jurisdiction over a given territory, and sovereignty as the idea that the source of legitimacy for that jurisdiction is derived from the people who constitute the nation. The Republic of Turkey has been a sovereign State only since 1923. Much of its constitutional development has focused on the assertion of this sovereignty in the face of continuing economic, social, political, and cultural influences emanating from more developed and powerful Western countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Italy, France. As a reaction to the Ottoman system and regime, Ataturk, who is the founder of the country, and his colleagues directed the new Republic to the Western values. For example, Civil Law from Switzerland, Criminal Law from Italy, and Commerce Law from Germany were adopted. However, the general structures of Army and Police Force as systems were mainly transferred from the Ottoman system. Although the Western democratic values had been put into practice by the time, the nature of policing in Turkey generally differs from that of Western democratic societies. The main reason is that the State has a holy meaning historically in the Turkish culture. The police are one of the main indicators and representatives of the State in social life. That's why it has a relatively different importance in the country. In other words, policing in Turkey is a State monopoly. The government closely controls the police with minimum input from the citizenry. Its responsibilities are broader, and it is more intrusive into the daily life of the public. In modern, contemporary Turkey, the police, as an organization, have a tremendous impact on the daily life of the Turkish people, and organizationally reach into every corner of life in urban residential areas. Therefore policing and problems related to it, not surprisingly, often rest at the top of the political agenda in Turkey. In the process, a number of seemingly inviolable features of both the police as an institution and policing as a set of functional activities have been criticized by some members of parliament and intellectuals—columnists in particular—in terms of the idea of democracy.

The Republic of Turkey has a national police organization, the General Directorate of Security (GDS), which is administered with a Western style law and order by a single and centralized department of the State. In other words, the Ministry for Internal Affairs (MIA) is charged with and authorized to provide internal security and social peace in all aspects of life in the country. The MIA is also authorized to fulfill its duties


(functions) through the GDS, the General Commandership of Gendarme (GCG) and the Commandership of Coast Guard (CCG), and to ask help from the Army when it is needed (for more information refer to Caglar, 1994). The GDS is charged with the general security and social order and peace problems in urban residential areas, whereas the GCG is charged with the same duties, i.e., have power of arrest, detention, search, etc., in both rural residential and non-residential areas. In other words, their areas of responsibility are clearly identified. They do not interfere with each other's work. They have no authority to instruct each other. Their organizations and ranks are different. However, they collaborate, work, and exchange information in the case of need. In fact, the gendarme reflects the inability and absence of the regular police to deal with intense threats to policing in rural areas. The economic benefit of this force is that the soldiers who serve their compulsory military service as gendarme are not paid at all. Every healthy man in Turkey has to complete his military service, and none of ordinary soldiers are paid during their compulsory military service. On the other hand, this link with the Army brings its own problems on behalf of the police. There have been difficulties of police-military liaison over their respective jurisdictions. Although in liberal-democracies the police are usually portrayed as the neutral arbiters who hold together the framework by which society's struggles are resolved peacefully (Brewer et. al., 1988:222), the gendarme are portrayed as the neutral arbiters in the Turkish public eye. This might be explained as an outcome of Turkey's tradition of a strong State and army in the history of the country. The Army people established the State. Army has a unique position in the Turkish society. It is not under the total control of government (politicians). Both army and public see army as the main protector of the State and society. That's why it is always seen as being the most trustworthy institution by the general public. In addition to that, serving in the army is culturally accepted by most people as being a "holy duty." The army is made up of sons of any family located in any part of country.<sup>1</sup> It is a compulsory service for all healthy men between age 18 and 42. They also serve for a temporary period. The standard length for ordinary service is 15 months. Therefore, it is reasonable that the gendarme is seen in the role and status as a neutral arbiter rather than the police being so. The CCG is charged with the enforcement of law on coastal related matters, and the officers of the CCG have the same power, as do the GDS' officers. However, this paper's focus is the GDS because they are Turkey's only police organization. In addition, the GDS is the main source of Turkey's policing policies, strategies, and operations. The GCG and the CCG practice exactly the same form of policing. Therefore they will not be discussed separately in this chapter.

The GDS is characterized by its central and hierarchical structure, i.e. there is only one central police force in the country. A General Director, who has the highest rank in the Organization, commands it from headquarters in Ankara, Turkey's capital. The Minister for Internal Affairs, who is appointed by government, appoints the General Director.<sup>2</sup> The Director is responsible for the general administration of the Organization, and assistant directors who are responsible for different departments of the Organization assist him. The Minister for Internal Affairs has, however, more power than the General Director of Security has. The General Director can refuse information on operational matters to his authority but he cannot refuse the demands of the Minister for Internal Affairs. Since the Minister has the power to require reports, he



also has the responsibility to answer to government and Parliament for efficient policing in the country. S/he has to answer questions which are directed by deputies in the Parliament on provincial or general policing as well. Figure 16.1 schematizes the control and accountability of Turkey's policing system.

**Figure 16.1:**  
**The Flow Chart of Control and Accountability in Policing in Turkey.**



The Turkish police are structured as a quasi-military organization, and the system of law enforcement is built on a subordinating chain of command. Although all units of a particular department are indirectly related to a central command, the overall chain of command is divided into units or sections so that different precincts or squads are directly responsible to a localized authority. The functional divisions of the departments follow the kinds of activities which they are mandated to handle, such as uniformed patrol, traffic patrol, investigative work, undercover work, terrorism, foreign refugee, foreign affairs, prevention, data processing, archive, fiscal matters, smuggling and narcotics, etc. In addition, the Turkish Police exercises its functions to maintain a reasonably uniform standard of policing everywhere in the country. Conditions of service are set nationally and give local agencies no more discretion. For example, in order to buy a computer for a local Office, it is compulsory to have GDS' permission. The lack of discretion even in an ordinary work creates more bureaucracy, which

leads to ineffective outcomes. The day-to-day police duties of crime prevention, patrolling, investigation, detention and law enforcement are handled by the police stations which are located in the districts of urban-residential areas. Police stations are very bureaucratic, and each one serves a different client population who resides in a particular district or area. Each station is governed and under the operational and administrative control of a head (chief) commissar. Three groups serve in shifts during the day. Each group serves for eight hours and consists of: a group chief, who has at least the rank of commissar or assistant commissar; a police officer, who is responsible for typing and writing communications and keeping the records; and ordinary police officers. The personnel of each police station, in turn, bring policing into practice according to policing policies of the country. The head commissar, commissar, or vice commissar has to use his/her discretion in deciding how he/she deploys his/her staff to maintain law and order, and there is the code of discipline within the organization which allows him/her to exercise control over his/her own force. However, the freedom of a chief officer from central organization and central government is not absolute. Each officer in any rank is answerable to his/her superiors. Although there are a few ranks in a police station, none has the prestige and authority of a head commissar who is usually the head of station and is responsible for the administration of their own station and for policing in the area. There is no kind of overseeing by the civilians.

The national Turkish Police Force takes responsibility for all national and international law and order functions, ranging from the control of drug smuggling to terrorism, from regulating traffic to helping people. In other words, the duty of the Turkish Police is defined as follows: "to keep our existence as State and nation away from both internal and external dangers in the democratic, free constitutional order; to provide and preserve the dominance of law; to provide social peace and order in the country; to provide and protect the life, properties and honor of citizens; to prevent possible criminal behaviors; to intervene (to form obstacles) in the continuation of committed crimes; to catch and arrest criminals and to submit them to judicial authorities for prosecution; and to carry out all duties that are given by the related legal procedure (laws)" (TPTGV, 1983:19).

This highly centralist model of hierarchy controls the organization from top to bottom. The GDS receives its funds from the general budget through the budget of MIA. Thus, the police force is centralized into one organization. There are both uniformed and plain-clothes personnel who are in charge of policing all over the country. For example, both staffs perform policing in traffic, narcotics, smuggling, protecting social order, terrorism, etc. The GDS provides all the needed information for criminal justice procedures (system). It operates communications and computer services on national and international levels with its local offices. The GDS provides education and training to new cadets after recruitment in police educational institutions, i.e. Police Lycee (named Police College), Police Vocational High Schools<sup>4</sup> and Police Academy. The GDS requires a minimum educational attainment, which is a Lycee or equivalent school for police vocational high school (ordinary police officers) and for Police Academy students, and it requires only a primary education degree (8 years education) for Police Lycee (Polis Koleji) students. Police vocational high schools provide two full years of education and training. The length of education and training in both Police Lycee and Police Academy is 4 academic years. Students live-in at all police edu-



cational institutions and all of the student's expenses during their education and training programs are paid (funded) by the GDS. Each student is also paid a certain amount of pocket money, monthly, which is re-determined, annually, by the GDS. Therefore, everyone has to either serve in the police force or pay back to the Organization the expenses incurred during his/her education period. Police vocational high school graduates are appointed to an ordinary police officer's post, of Police Academy to the administrators' posts, which start with the Assistant Commissar rank. Police Lycee graduates are accepted as students to either the police vocational high school or into the Police Academy. It seems that there is an effort in police recruit socialization during their education and training to create a central identity, as an integrated occupational group. This subculture divides society in two parts in general: police and the others. However, this is not a clear-cut division. There are some identified groups in society that police sub-culture define as the people who dislike the police, such as media people, leftist groups, and university students. This creates a strong feeling of informal solidarity between police officers that police should help and protect police. This is verbalized as follows: "no friends of police except police". Such a sub-culture sometimes leads police officers to *silence* in the case of wrongdoing of individual police officers. However, this cannot be defined as a planned and organized policy which is enforced during recruits' education and training. It can be accepted as an outcome of socialization process that is seen in every police force in the world.

The GDS provides and operates forensic laboratories to conduct scientific analysis of evidence, and maintains a central record repository for records of criminal data, fingerprints, and background data. The police also provide some auxiliary services in the areas of forensic, communications, records, and training. The police use vehicles, which are each painted blue and white, which slightly correspond to the uniform color, which is dark blue. For administrative purposes, the Republic of Turkey is divided into 81 provinces. The GDS had organized and established the *directorates of city security* in all cities (provinces) and *directorates or authority of town security* (Ilce Emniyet Mudurlugu or Amirligi) in 728 towns. There were 1,380 police stations in Turkey in 2002. The total number of police is 172,530 [administrators (15,244) and ordinary police officers (157,286)] (EGM, 2001). The members of each security directorate in cities and towns are dispersed among several precincts and specialize narrowly in areas of police work such as traffic, narcotic, fiscal, murder, social peace and order (*asayis*), terrorism, organized crime, etc. There are both uniformed and plain-clothes personnel who are in charge of the police. The GDS provides all needed information for the criminal justice system. It operates communications and computer services on both national and international levels with its local offices.

The power of police is authorized and encouraged for the maintenance of law enforcement and social order, and preservation of the State authority. The manner in which they work and the tactics and techniques which they employ are greatly affected by the policies of the GDS. In other words, the national Turkish Police Force is homogeneous and monolithic and operates with a single style, which is suited to the traditions and character of the State and society. In their defense of public order, the police have been provided with technological equipment and arms, which make the police a kind of military organization. Militarizing the police in this way occurs in Turkey because of the preference for arming the police rather than using the Army in situa-

tions of public disorder and terrorist events, which "*sit more easily with liberal views of the relationship between society and the State*" (Brewer et. al., 1988:222). In addition, as in most other countries, the Police Force in Turkey is able to fall back on military help in situations of major civil unrest. On some rare occasions, the military have been called in to replace (rather than assist) the police in situations where the police have been unable to enforce the law and to provide social peace and order. For example, there is today a state of temporary emergency in some provinces of the eastern part of the country, because of armed attacks of the Kurdish separatist movements, the PKK. In these provinces, the military has mostly replaced the police in order to re-establish social peace and order in the area.

Consequently, when the general structure and operation of Turkey's policing style are considered, it is possible to say that their policing style provides support for Wilson's *legalistic style of policing*. In other words, although it is possible to find some policing forms of other policing styles, such as *watchman* and *service* styles, the Turkish Police mostly exercises the legalistic style of policing when the Wilson's terms are used (Caglar, 1999:121-132). That is, Turkey's police officers issue a high rate of traffic tickets and arrest a high rate of people who are suspected of being offenders. A single standard of policing conduct is formally expected to be exercised in every corner of the country rather than different standards existing for different groups or regions.

This general introduction and explanation leads into discussing Turkish policing and corruption in policing.

### Corruption in Policing

Corruption can be metaphorically referred to as a universal "virus". No matter what the political system is, corruption is everywhere. "*It has no economic, political, cultural, ideological or geographical boundaries*" (Giogardze, 2001:1). There is no single country without problems related to corruption. However, its density, percentage, and actual, as well as potential, opportunities for corruption are less manifest in developed democratic countries, because of the relatively high levels of "transparency" of their political and policing system. Corruption is wide spread in the developing countries as well as countries going through political and economic transitions. It destroys citizen's moral ethics and their confidence in their country's social, judicial, economic, and political system. Corruption has a wide range of meanings that can be briefly defined as the misuse of authority and power by the State officials. Such corruption is manifested by unlawful and immoral acts done with the intent to give some advantages to someone or to oneself, which are inconsistent with professional-official duty. It is very difficult to uncover and/or to win the battle against corruption because, corruption is a kind of action in which both "actors"—the corrupter and the corrupted—gain advantages.

Corruption is an institutional-wide process and phenomena in Turkey. It is possible to find corruption in different levels of almost in all of Turkey's State bureaucratic institutions from banking system, custom affairs, to State purchasing. (For more information refer to, Hurriyet, 15/02/2002 and Radikal, 16/2/2002). This means that corruption in Turkey is not unique to its policing. The Turkish Police do not have a monopoly on corruption. Turkey's Police are not different from the rest of their society. In fact, the police reflect the characteristics of Turkish society and present social



structure in which it operates. However, for the purpose of this chapter, the focus is only in policing corruption. Although all kinds of corruption in any institution destroy democratic functions of society, corruption among police officers and in the judicial system are very significant dangers to the democratic function of society. The stability of social, economic and political systems of the society are affected more than any other institutions, which suffer from corruption. It endangers the essential rights and liberties of citizens, and also deprives citizens from enjoying the principle of equality. In short, corruption, in total, is extremely dangerous for democracy itself.

It is obvious that police work is complex and varied. Police functions such as stopping, searching, questioning, arresting, preventing, detecting, investigating crime, and criminal activities are clearly a major part of the criminal justice system. However, the status of Turkey's police, in the public eye, is undoubtedly ambivalent, and perhaps even mostly negative (Caglar, 1994; Ozcan and Caglar, 1994). A high level of criticism and complaint are directed towards Turkey's police. The main reason for this is the non-professional manifestations of job-related conduct that can be related to generally as *corruption*.

Problems and corruption in policing in Turkey can be investigated under two main foci:

- The first one is *Organizational-Based Problems and Corruption* and
- the second is *Officer-Based Problems and Corruption*.

These are two main structural sources, from which Turkish policing problems and corruption flourish. The organizational based problems and corruption primarily exist in both the recruitment process and promotion system while the officer-based problems and corruption are manifest in daily policing enforcement activities. The reader should be aware that policing is still a sensitive topic to study academically in Turkey, and that this study is the first one on this subject.

### Organizational Based Problems and Corruption

Social events and phenomena are always multi-dimensional, multi-factorial, complex, and dynamic phenomena, and as such are most likely to be non-linear in their essence. They are not single—factor *cause and effect* simple processes. This holds for policing problems and corruption as well. Many factors can be posited (theoretically as well as empirically-based) as causes and consequences. However, some of them have greater influence or making a larger contribution, and playing a more important role than others. Following are the main factors that are seen as effecting problems and corruption in policing in Turkey.

### Police Recruitment

One of the most important processes that leads to problems and corruption in policing is related to recruitment. Recruitment can be accepted as the very first step into a profession. Given the importance of the police force for the maintenance of social law and order, and the security of both the public-at large and the State, the purpose of a police selection process is to ascertain which job candidates have the highest potential for developing into successful police officers (Poland 1978:374). Personnel selection in law enforcement is, therefore, equally important, not only for organizational effectiveness, but also for the protection of other police officers and the

general public, as well (Topp and Kardash 1986:3; Spielberg, 1979; Cohen and Chaiken, 1972). In other words, a most appropriate and objective personnel selection is the '*sine qua non*' to the future of a law enforcement service—which is essential for any democratic society—because, the effectiveness of a law enforcement organization rests to a large degree on its ability to adequately select, train, monitor, and supervise its personnel (Colarelli and Siegel 1964:287). Therefore, to ascertain which applicants have the highest potential for developing into successful police officers can be accepted as a common approach for all police organizations regardless of the political structure of countries and of the bureaucratic structure of police organizations. For example, a world-wide survey done by United Nations (UN) (1992:24) documents that almost all countries require some sort of fitness, minimum height, which usually is different for men and women, minimum and maximum weight, a minimal educational level, a medical-psychiatric examination, a physical agility test, a psychological test, a background checkup, etc. Some countries also require an IQ test. Further reported criteria included citizenship, single marital status, no criminal convictions, military service completed, good vision, not needing glasses, no color-blindness, a driving license, the ability to swim, loyalty to the State, loyalty to a socialist system, etc. Additionally, nearly all police organizations required persons who meet these criteria to take and pass a civil service examination.

The main proposition regarding corruption in policing in Turkey is that its recruitment process is problematic, that the process is not purely an objective one and is not based *only* on professional requirements. Some incapable people are also recruited in an unprofessional way, leading to an unsuccessful and a "tough", abusive policing which prevents democratic policing.

One of the most important deficiencies regarding the recruitment process is recruiting children of people who are covered by the Law numbered 2330, named the Law on Giving Compensation and Paying Monthly Salary (*Nakdi Tazminat Verilmesi ve Aylık Baglanmasi Hakkinda Kanun*). Since 1993, the children of public servants, of police officers in particular, who were killed on duty (called martyrs-*sehit*), are recruited to the Police Force without any examination or with a very low grade, which is less than half of the other candidates' grades. No other conditions for height and weight are required, and they are given a two-year *tolerance* or advantage on the required age limit. Although this system was partly restricted since 2000, no further legal regulation changes have been introduced yet. The Law is still valid. It is obvious that this is a given privilege to the people identified above and a violation of equality of the Turkish citizens. In spite of restricted usage, the validation of the Law means that there is always a possibility to enforce it. In addition, from 1995 to 2001, there was another even more serious and dangerous way of recruiting incapable and unqualified candidates to the Police Force; a process of exempted recommendations. The Minister of Internal Affairs had three, the Undersecretary had two, and the General Director of Security had two quotas for each Police School. Each of them had the right to ask school directors that their recommended candidates be accepted in the school and that they be exempt from any of the police recruit requirements. Seven such recommendations per Police School for 25 Police Schools throughout Turkey resulted in 175 incapable and unqualified police recruits being accepted to Police Schools every single year. It should not be forgotten that these quotas are an official right granted to these



three high level administrators. And this phenomenon was aside from "unofficial instructions". Research documents that with the people who benefited from Law, 2330; approximately 800 people are accepted into Turkey's Police Force every year. This amounts to 8 % of all recruits annually. This can be accepted as a form of nepotism. There is no need to analyze this data. It is obvious that this is a violation of citizens' equality, an act against the democratic rules and ethics, and an act that definitely results in unprofessional policing. Shortly, this institutionalized process causes corruption in the policing system. It is also a violation of Constitutional rights of every Turkish citizen. The Constitution clearly states that "*no one has right to have any kind of privileges and every Turkish citizen is equal with regards to Law*".

One other significant issue in the recruitment process is that candidates who are less likely to control their inner impulses or to structure their behavior in an orderly way are definitely not suitable for policing. Policing, as is well known, is a job, involving many unpleasant practices. It is known that *normal* people control their deviant impulses by thinking about the outcomes of their behaviors and what kind of punishment they can receive if they carry them out. A police officer, as a law enforcement agent, is expected to be more capable to control his/her impulses, instincts, and personal feelings than any ordinary citizen when he/she performs his/her duty. That is why each police organization uses some kinds of psychological and psychiatric tests during recruitment to select the most appropriate candidates. In addition, psychologists and psychiatrists are members of the recruitment panel. In Turkey, unfortunately, no similar tests are used. These tests were simply not seen as a necessity, and there was no such expert in the recruitment panel board till recently. This means, for example, that if a candidate is shorter by only 0.1cm than the required 1.67cms, he/she has no chance to be recruited as a police officer, no matter how much s/he is capable for the job. However, a psychopath can easily be recruited because no psychological and psychiatric tests were administered by the occupational experts. It is presumed that the candidates who were not able to control their personal feelings, instincts and impulses, and were not suitable for the job were nevertheless recruited. When this is permitted, with a combination of other factors such as insufficient education and training, hard working conditions, low occupational status, etc. such a recruited police officer is more likely to manifest, perform, and even "infect" an unprofessional and corrupted policing.

A third problem in the recruitment process arises from the *background investigation of applicants and his/her first degree relatives*. The background investigation is a necessary and important tool in the field of police personnel selection. The background investigation of applicants who have qualified for the eligibility list and who are being considered for immediate appointment is officially done by local police officers where the applicants reside and are officially registered. But most of the interviewed senior officers stated that they have doubts about the background investigation process. Further, they even said that *night guards*, who are a supplementary force to police officers who work at night and have just primary and secondary school education, mostly do this investigation or they write their reports in their offices without questioning the applicant's contacts.

The main and essential problem in the background investigation of an applicant is related to the personal characteristics, values, prejudices and political preferences of

the officer(s) in charge of carrying out the investigation, whose ability as an investigator, interrogator, reporter and evaluator of evidence has not been proven in the crucible of experience. In other words, although police officers have to evaluate, on a daily basis, human beings in terms of the evidence presented by eye-witnesses to an event, a gap exists between this kind of necessary investigation and the actual background investigation which is limited and is carried out by untrained, inexperienced and non-professional officers can and do decide most issues on the basis of their personal experience, attitudes, emotional reactions, and political preferences. An officer who has not had sufficient training, knowledge, the necessary abilities and experience unconsciously eliminates all applicants except those who reflect his/her own concept of: "the ideal" or satisfactory candidate. In addition, s/he may investigate more thoroughly some individuals who do not measure up to his/her standards until sufficient facts are available to disqualify them (Blum 1964:175; Ross, 1964). It would be preferable that professionals whose loyalties to the police organization and the code of ethics of law enforcement have been adequately proven should be used in the process of background investigation. Although such a process might be more expensive in comparison with the present one, the police organization as well as society-at-large will definitely benefit in the long term.

### Background Investigator

The background investigator is assigned to make all necessary checks and interviews to determine the qualifications of the applicant in the Turkish Police Organization. Regardless of the results of examinations, if the result of a background (security) investigation or oral interview of an applicant is negative, s/he has no chance to be appointed as a police officer, and has no right to reapply for another exam afterward. In one sense, the investigator him/herself has the power of the examining board. Therefore, s/he should clearly have the ability to understand that the facts of a candidate's past behavior will be the foundation for predicting future behavior. S/he should also have the ability to discriminate between what is and what is not important, according to the published criteria and of the organization's unwritten standards. While this general description of the investigator may be sufficient to establish an understanding of the need for careful selection for the task, his/her training is a matter of additional importance. That is, the investigator, for example, should receive additional appropriate training through reading, discussion, and formal education if s/he does not have it when assigned to the task. S/he should also have sound fundamental knowledge concerning the nature of emotional maturity, social dynamics, and the general field of cultural anthropology. In the field of moral standards, however, the criteria become more difficult to define (Blum, 1964:175). That is, whose moral standards should be applied? When does *social drinking* become *alcoholism*? Does the fact that a candidate successfully defended him/herself in a paternity suit while suffering a loss in reputation render him/her unsuited for the service? Is divorce a limitation? (1964:175). The answer to most of these questions may vary according to the culture of the community in which it is asked, and it even may vary within the same community depending upon the period of time in which it is asked. It is difficult to find the standard answers to these questions, when senior officers are interviewed.



It was observed that each one uses his personal opinion and interpretation regarding the issues mentioned.

### Civil Service Examinations and Interviews

The content of civil service examinations and the objectivity of the oral interview procedure are a fourth problem source. First of all the civil service examination is not directly related to the police service when it is analyzed in terms of its content. Notwithstanding this, it is one of the main examinations in the recruitment process, which is very effective and important, especially for the recruitment of ordinary police officers. It eliminates a large number of applicants, and therefore it may be considered to be a poor predictor because of rejecting applicants who would possibly be well qualified for police work.

The senior police officials who have been interviewed were asked to give their opinion on the objectivity of the recruitment process, particularly the oral interview. Although applicants have a right to object to the results of the written examination, they do not have the right to object to the results of the oral interview; which in reality is the final verdict of the Board. This gives an unquestionable power to the Board.<sup>5</sup> Although all Turkish citizens have legally equal rights to apply to become police officers, this unquestionable power creates some questions about the objectivity of the recruitment process in the Turkish Police Organization. In addition, the senior police officials claimed that recruitment is based completely on merit and policy to recruit the best applicant in terms of qualifications. They also agreed about the objectivity of all examinations, which were the main measurement and screening instruments of the recruitment process in the Turkish Police Force. In addition, two of them gave the following very interesting explanations:

*I never trust these exams. Do you think it is possible to evaluate an applicant in terms of his/her speech, comprehension, expressive abilities and his/her vision just in 30 seconds in an interview? Yes, just in 30 seconds.... We are fortune-tellers. We are the most clever people, you know! So in half a minute we do all these jobs.... (A.A.).*

*Actually, to be honest, we did something wrong. The streets show this to us. The bad image and aggressive behaviors of police officers proved that we did something wrong. We evaluate an applicant during the interview just in about 30-45 seconds. But we have to. Because, every year almost 30,000 people apply for the job. What can we do? We cannot do anything else if the exam regulations are not changed.... Another problem, the senior officer who has the highest rank in the exam commission is much more influential on decision-making regarding applicants. All members of the commission do not discuss the decision in detail. The lower rank officers do not and cannot object to the decision of a higher rank officer, although they were told to do so. You know, there is a strict hierarchy in our profession. It is not easy for a lower rank officer to challenge a decision of a higher rank officer. The commission members are also forced and influenced by non-members senior officers about some*

*candidates in order to make them successful. Yes, this is very bad, but a reality we have to accept (A.E).*

In addition, when the regional and provincial background of police officers within the organization is reviewed, it is obvious that the police officers are recruited mostly from the provinces where the number of votes and political representatives (members of Parliament) of the rightist political parties are much higher than the leftist or social democrat parties (For more information refer to Caglar 1994: Ch.5 and SIS 1992: XII-XXIII). This was also demonstrated by the 1995 general elections. (SIS 1996). In addition, a weekly nation-wide news magazine (Nokta) carried out a small-scale inquiry on the recruitment issue in the police organization in Turkey in 1990. According to this, the main requirement for recruitment of the police officers was to be religious. Being a religious person is also very important in order to be promoted to higher positions in the police organization (Nokta, 1990). However, this approach seems to have waned during recent years. Because Turkey is a secular country, there is a separation of State and religion by Constitution. However, political and religious preferences of administrators are sometimes effective in policing regarding issues. All of these events and processes demonstrate that the Turkish police force is generally politically motivated. For example, police officers used the finger symbol of the extreme nationalist party, National Action Party, and protested against the governor (who is appointed by the government in power, which was a central rightist coalition) accusing him of being a *communist governor* in a police demonstration in Tunceli province in 1995 (Duzgoren 1996:8). In addition, the police demonstrations that were unlawfully carried out in Istanbul (on 12/12/2000), Adana, Gaziantep, Bursa, Mersin, and Antalya provinces (on 13/12/2000) also demonstrated the same occupational culture and political climate that the police officers have. It is posited that rightist parties, being in power since the 1950s, have been a major factor of the ongoing reality of Turkey's police corruption. Police power is and has always been under the dominance of political power in Turkey. It is a given that when political power is used wisely and fosters sound police administration, society is the fortunate beneficiary. When political manipulators prostitute the police service for selfish ends and vested interests, society must contend with confusion, uncertainty, and a double standard of enforcement, Turkish society is, unfortunately, sufficiently familiar with this phenomena.

### The Occupational Culture and Political Climate

The occupational culture and political climate, which are dominant in the police organization, generally lead to an unprofessional, subjective policing such as protecting a law-violator colleague, treating leftist people as criminal, etc. that also can and does destroy the public trust in democratic values. Although the police see themselves as serving in a politically neutral way, mandated to serve all citizens neutrally (See also for British Police, Reiner, 1991:210), some interest and pressure groups, who are generally of leftist ideology, are seen in society as being violators of the law who threaten the civil liberties and rights of the majority citizens and the proper functioning of the policing system. Conservatives and rightist groups, relatively speaking, are seen as not having such problems with the police (Caglar, 1994). In other words, the Turkish Police do not treat both leftist and rightist social groups the same (For details see, Radikal, 15/12/1998:8). Just using this example, it can be said that Turkey manifests a



double standard in its policing. A huge portion of the Turkish mass media plays an important role in this double standard. For example, a group of gunmen raided and occupied the Swiss Hotel in Istanbul on 23/04/2001 and took all guests present in the hotel as hostages for 12 hours. At the beginning, it was thought that they were "leftists" protesting the *F Type Prison System*.<sup>6</sup> They were labeled as terrorists by all of the mass media and by the police authorities. However, a few hours later it was understood that they were Chechen sympathizers protesting against Russia for the war in Chechnya, and most of Turkey's media and some police administrators changed the word "terrorists" that they had used at the beginning of the event to *the Chechen Resistances*. In addition, some religious press and TVs called them as *Chechen Fighters*, *Chechen Heroes* (Radikal, 24/04/2001). Some groups, in addition, especially "leftists" or union members, are more likely to be affected by law enforcement than others who are considered as being "a potential law violator" by the police. For example, ex-President Suleyman Demirel stated in a press conference in 1979, when he was Prime Minister, "you cannot make me say that the rightist groups commit crimes" (Caglar, 1995:183-184). Although technical efficiency and high arrest rates characterize this style of policing or law enforcement, it also results in inequality in law enforcement with complaints of police harassment and brutality by groups or people who are most often subjected to police scrutiny. Such a policing policy, occupational culture, and treatment result in some social groups isolating themselves from the rest of society and developing hostile feelings towards the political system, particularly against the police force. For example, the London Metropolitan Police arrested the son of Britain's Prime Minister for drunkenness (Radikal, 8/7/2000:24). Such an event for Turkey would be a dream, or a fantasy that could never come about, even though the Turkish power elites say on many occasions that Turkey is a democratic law abiding State and that everybody is equal before the law. In sum, these kinds of unprofessional practices prevent achieving the goal of police accountability both judicially and with regard to the public-at large. One can consider categorizing such practices as being *organizational structure based corruption*. Police who are compelled to operate and to police within such an environment cannot function effectively. They lack the fundamental basis upon which to build, reinforce and to maintain self-respect. The ongoing negative image of the Turkish police, both nationally and internationally, can be viewed and accepted as an outcome of this one-sided policy and unprofessional way of occupational conduct.

#### Turkey's Police Socialization and Induction Process

In addition, the socialization and induction process of police officers also contributes considerably more to unprofessional policing in the country. It produces a unique police culture that develops a strong solidarity among police officers, even in the case of law violations. The main belief is that there are "no friends of police except police" and that "police should protect police". The strong ties and solidarity between same year graduates, the peers, (*devre arkadasligi*) and bonds of friendship among officers are very common and are generally tolerated by the occupational culture of Turkey's police. These officers owe a loyalty to each other. They rely on peer loyalty for their sense of personal safety. Hence, if an officer calls for help, his peer is expected to give that first priority (Caglar, 2001). It is also unusual for police officers to report evi-

dence about police corruption to their superiors or to judicial mechanisms. Reporting may likely result in identifying more corruption on the one hand, and the informer can be labeled as being a traitor or betrayer on the other. In general, the police sub-culture and occupational socialization prevents ones reporting against colleagues; the well documented *code of silence*. However, some senior officers stated that police are essentially free of corruption except for the presence of a few cases. Police corruption, as a problem has not been openly acknowledged in Turkey. A justification is that "this is an organization with 175,000 officers. There may be few rotten-apple in the box...". Turkey continues to hold on to the "rotten apple" police corruption thesis which has long since been challenged in developed Western democracies such as UK, Germany and France. Such a position points to an ongoing strong occupational "chauvinism" and defensiveness that can be considered to be facets of an accepted police corruption.

#### Discretionary Authority

Furthermore, it is possible, in one sense, to say that there is a "punishment-centered bureaucracy" (Waddington, 1999:128) in the Turkish Police. This generally arises from the approaches and exercises of discretionary authority of senior officers. As Bordua and Reis argued, the history of policing has been characterized by the attempts of senior officers to extend their effective control over their subordinates (cited by Waddington, 1999:128). In the Turkish Police case, there is a strong *invisible rule*, which proves such a treatment. The interviews for this study documented that this rule is: "the senior is always right. In the case of wrong, he is again right (*Ust her zaman haklidir. Haksiz olsada haklidir*)". This tough and unprofessional style of control and command structure, in essence, turns officers into function-bound "robots" who just obey the commands of superiors, whoever and whatever they are. There is almost no policing input from officers to police *under* their command. In this hierarchy the subordinate police officer exercises exactly the same kind of relationships when he/she is in contact with his/her subordinates or with the public.

#### Promotion and Appointment

Another important factor that leads to corrupt Turkish policing is the violation of the promotion and appointment system due to politician's interference, which is done by police chiefs with the influence of politicians. Although there is a reluctance to admit a direct connection between the police and politics in Turkey, *policing itself is a political activity* (Brewer et. al., 1988:4-5), and politics has an effective and important role in policing. First of all, decisions concerning enforcement policies, police resources, organization and administration are essentially matters of political choice. Secondly, the Turkish police, as an organization, do not have full discretion or a role to play in decisions concerning promotion of senior police officials and policing strategies in general. Although the politicians cannot directly tell the police how to operate, very effective final sanctions are available to the Minister of Internal Affairs: If s/he feels that any police administrator should be dismissed, is inadequate or is insufficient, s/he can order the Police Organization to dismiss him/her or to change or replace his/her position. Under such conditions one is obligated to ask: how far can the force operate without political interference? Turkish political history, since 1950, has emphasized differing conceptions of "law and order" such that the national police organization and policing practices have exhibited considerable inconsistency. The Turkish



police organization has been used by governments to serve different political factions, rather than standing as a unified body and a professional law enforcement organization and system with consistent practices that derive from constitutionally directed duties (Nokta, 1990).

In general, two types of cases related to promotion and appointment merit noting as forms of police corruption: Serving in each region of the country and being promoted to a higher post. The Police Duty and Authority Law, enacted in 1934, clearly explains that each police officer, either ordinary police officer or an administrator, has to serve according to a years-schedule in each region of the country. Ideally this is a very equitable approach, and is in accordance with good governance and democratic administration. However, in actual practice this system does not work totally in accordance with Turkish law and related regulations. That is why it is possible to metaphorically divide all police staffing—both the *ordinary* and the *administrators*—into two groups: the *real kids* and the *step kids*. The *real kids* are relatively few in comparison with the *step kids*. They generally have political connections and get whatever they need. For example, the ability to remain till their retirement in the province (duty location) he wants, and to work in the department and post that he wants. The *step kids* are the majority, who have no such power-connections nor the desired opportunities. They go to wherever they have been appointed and work at the post and department to which they have been assigned. The study's interviews, done with police officers, clearly documented that such a practice demoralizes those who have no advantageous opportunities. As a result, they have lost their belief and confidence in their superiors and in their organization. They do their job because of being in charge to do as well as not to lose their regular income. This work style unfortunately creates ignorance about many policing practices, lack of dedication to the job and an unprofessional way of conduct. The result is inadequate, subjective, and unprofessional policing, which can reasonably be considered as "corrupt policing." The following interview data help us to understand the process:

*...Sorry to say this but most of us are suffering because of this double standard. If everybody is treated equally, no problem we can accept all difficulties, go and serve in everywhere. This is our country and we are police officers. But I can give you many names, for example, those who were and are always in Ankara. They did not serve even a month out of Ankara, or they have been appointed wherever they wanted. Why? Because they have political connections. You graduated from the same school. You even may be a more successful student than him; you finish your period of life in which you are moving from one city to another; but he is always in Ankara and lives in lojman (apartments provided by the Organization), has a police organization vehicle (makam arabasi). Tell me? In such a situation, how much can you dedicate yourself to your job? You have already many other problems. You either have to find a politician to do the same or to survive like this... (N.B.).*

In addition, a Ph.D. research<sup>7</sup> carried out (Gultekin, 1997:201-211) with 306 police directors/administrators in 1997 who worked in 15 different provinces across the

country on appointments and promotions in the Turkish Police supports the same findings: Data of the research covered 40 four-star, 62 three-star, 65 two-star, 24 one-star directors, 47 superintendents and 68 chief inspectors. Findings documented that 72 % of the sample reported that the regulations for appointments are not applied appropriately. More than half of them (51 %) also stated that the regulations of promotion are not applied appropriately. The researcher clearly stated that "*those appointments and promotions are usually carried beyond objective rules*" (1997:208). Gultekin and Ozcan (1999:69) state that "*political interference seems to be the most important reason for out-of-rule applications in promotion and transfers*". In sum, these findings also documented that subjective interests and interference mostly regulate appointments and promotions in the Turkish Police Organization. Every political party, which is in power, wishes to have the kind of people in the key positions who have sympathy towards their political views, or who advocate the objectives of their party. Changing government means also changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and General Directorate of Security (The Headquarter of the Police Organization). This reality pushes police, higher rank officers in particular, to have connections with politicians in order to keep their positions or to advance to a higher position. Inevitably, the result is serious deviations from the rules, which affect not only the efficiency and quality of the service provided by the Police, but also lowers the morale and job satisfaction of police officers (1999:69; Kent and Eisenberg, 1972), which leads to an improper, unprofessional—corrupted—policing.

### Obstacles to Democratic Policing

It is also necessary to mention some other factors which serve as obstacles to democratic policing in Turkey—in addition to those factors leading to policing problems and corruption in the Turkish Police Organization. One of them is related to the complaint procedure. The lack of an independent monitoring and controlling body, such as a Police Complaint Bureau, which is independent of the Police and Ministry of Internal Affairs, also contributes to corruption in Turkey's policing system. When an officer violates any law, his/her colleagues from the same organization, a subdivision of the GDS, make an inquiry and decide whether or not to take any disciplinary or judicial action. It has been adequately documented that the police occupational culture and their "solidarity" prevent taking action against ordinary cases of police misbehavior and unlawful policing (Caglar, 2001). This also produces and serves to reinforce the attitude of, and acculturates officers into "*police should protect police*". In other words, there is no independent commission in Turkey that the public can turn to in the case of unlawful policing. The GDS does, however, have an Inspection Department in its structure. This Department oversees the investigation of complaints against police officers and essentially functions as the disciplinary body for Turkey's police officers. Any citizen who feels aggrieved by the behavior of a police officer—up to the highest rank—can lodge a formal complaint under the articles of the Turkish Criminal Law to Court, enacted in 1926. Each police officer is individually responsible for his/her own actions. However, this system does not work efficiently. Almost nobody uses it. This is so because there is a belief that a police officer cannot objectively investigate another one. A second reason for this belief arises from the Law titled *The Trial Law of Public Officers* (*Memurin Muhakemat Kanunu*) which was enacted in 1908 and transferred



from the Ottoman Legislation System. According to this law, in order to question a State officer in any Court, it is compulsory to get official permission from his superiors, and from the governor of the town or province. Otherwise, it is not possible to question him/her in the Court. As a result of this, there is almost no input from Turkey's citizenry against unlawful policing. This has dual importance: it makes police officers less responsible to the public on the one hand, and serves to make them unpopular on the other. Some studies (Caglar, 1994; Ozcan and Caglar 1994) documented that the police are more likely to be unpopular than any other governmental officers or civil servants in Turkey. This results in a lack of needed confidence in the Police, which is the main and critical agent of Turkey's law enforcement system.

Another barrier to the democratization of the Police Organization results from the lack of police associations, or unions, to serve as a protective umbrella for both the police organization and individual police officers. Although police organizations do not have the right to actively strike in any democratic country, such police associations can and do provide legitimate help to its members and defend specified rights of police officers. In Turkey, the police as an organization had an unpleasant experience of getting organized into associations. The Turkish Police were given the right to organize themselves by the 1961 Constitution, which was the most democratic Constitution in all of Turkey's history in terms of human rights. They were allowed to organize in order to defend their occupational right, to struggle for improving their work conditions, etc. This right was not granted to police only. It was a constitutional right for all people. The police started to establish their own associations and these associations became very effective and influential in the 1970s. Subsequent to being given the right of establishing their own association, the police started to divide into two main groups: (a) *Pol-Bir* (Police Unity), which was the extreme and central rightist police officers association, (b) *Pol-Der* (Police Association), which was the leftist and social democrat police officers association. This separation created a day-to-day hostility among police officers. This hostility and ideological climate was also directed towards the police-public citizenry relationships. For example, if a rightist group held a political demonstration, the members of *Pol-Bir* tolerated them whereas the members of *Pol-Der* did not, and vice versa. It was also possible to see conflicts and fights between these two different police associations' members. They were closed and banned by the Military Coup Administration (MCA)<sup>8</sup> in 1980, and most of the leftist police officers were dismissed from the Police Organization. There was a strong pressure and control on the public life by the military administration. It was an extraordinary period; law and courts were not effective against decisions of the military administration. That's why, there was no any response from the public or from the media or from any other institution. After these changes, *rightist* police candidates were purposely recruited. Police response to *rightist* and leftist demonstrators was and continues to be totally different and selective. For example, the police attitudes and policing practices against the leftist and rightist student demonstrations were totally different. They were more tolerable to rightist or religious student demonstrations than the leftist students' ones. Police tactics and behaviors during industrial disputes, at political demonstrations and during the course of violence in universities and street disorders in certain inner city areas have damaged its image of being the police for all of Turkish society. These developments made police less a part of Turkish society, and more separate and differ-

ent from it. As a result of this, Turkey's police problem has moved into the forefront of public attention, mainly by some media people and members of Parliament. There are some efforts to improve the quality of the police, particularly through its education system. If this succeeds, it should help to further a needed more democratic policing.

The current policing system presents another barrier to democratic policing in Turkey. Constitutional changes, the changes reducing individual freedom and rights, and increasing power of police in public order legislation and in the Law of Police Duties and Authorities (LPDA, numbered 2559) made in 1982 by the Military Coup Administration have placed a strain on police-public relations and have also reawakened doubts about the nature of the Turkish State. The history of the Turkish Police documents that structural change and developments in the Police Organization occurred as a result of reactions to crisis situations in policing. For example, the increasing of terrorist activities from 1984 to 1999 led to important changes in new units such as the establishment of the Anti-Terror Section and the Organized Crime Section. However, these changes mostly occurred in a bureaucratic reorganization and not in a renewing of needed policing strategies because of the conservative nature of the Police Organization and of its derived consequences. This "phenomena" can actually be considered as the accepted general character, or paradigm, of the Turkish bureaucracy. In sum, changes in the nature of "public order policing", enacted against union rights (worker rights), civil servants and university staff and students' association rights, and attempts to de-politicize virtually all sections of society have encouraged the view that the Turkish State is becoming increasingly authoritarian. Naturally, these developments made Turkey's police more powerful, and the police manifested a strict control of daily life.

In addition, the lack of a clear, definitive job description in Turkey's policing system is yet another problematic source which leads to improper policing. Put simply, neither police officers nor the public know what are the exact duties of the police. There is no definitive police officer job description. For example, the GDS has to enforce (apply) the articles and verdicts of 271 laws, 51 rules-regulations (*tuzuk*), 168 bylaws (*yonetmelik*), 87 Ministers Cabinet Orders and 62 codes (directions, instructions -*yonerge*) (Caglar, 1995:172). It is obvious that it is impossible to become an expert on every matter regarding policing. (see also Mawby, 1999:13-22). It hardly needs to be emphasized that the unclear job description and the inevitable overlap between jurisdictions can and does lead to rivalries between forces, duplication of effort and ultimately to a less efficient prosecution of the criminal. The result is an inefficient policing.

### Individual Officer Based Problems and Corruption

The police have a unique place in Turkish Society in that it is expected to enforce the law and to protect and keep social order and peace. For this reason, the police are granted special powers and prerogatives, which include the right and obligation to bear arms, along with the authority to take away citizens' liberty by arresting them.<sup>9</sup> This power is more influential with those people who live on the periphery (relatively small towns and cities). A problem exists due to the people's understanding of "police". A police officer means *LAW*! There is an important difference between policing in developed and developing (including countries in transition) countries: In both developing countries and countries in transition, people are not afraid of the Law. They



fear the men of Law. In a developed country, on the other hand, it is usual to see a person standing up and defending his rights against a police officer in cases in which he believes that he is right. In the Turkish scenario, police officers do not allow *anyone* to talk against them. Neither can anyone challenge police conduct, nor can anyone behave against a police officer. This gives Turkey's police officers a greater power than what is granted to them by law. It is almost a total, unquestionable power. This naturally brings about the abuse or misuse of power, which is the path to corruption of a variety of types. There is a common belief in Turkish society that if you find a way or someone, you can easily get free from the hand of the law and from law enforcement agents, i.e. police officer. You would not be charged or punished, and you would be released. As Waddington (1999:121) states, there are many opportunities for police officers to abuse their discretion and power by accepting or demanding bribes so as to "turn a blind eye". In addition, it is necessary to point out that not all of Turkey's police officers are corrupt or are corruptible. Were this otherwise, it would not be possible for the Turkish police as an organization, system, functions, etc. to operate continuously. The society will search for an alternative to replace it. In addition, it has yet to be seen that a completely dysfunctional institution has survived for a long time.

Many different factors operate regarding individual-based policing problems and corruption in Turkey: The most important one is that police officers most generally come from a low and middle socio-economic background. They are mostly from extended families and have grown up in small towns and rural areas, which socialized them, relatively, into a more conservative way of life. In a sense, they mainly come from the disadvantaged social strata of society (Ozcan and Caglar, 1994; Caglar, 2001). All police related studies document that most of the ordinary officers became police officers because they did not find another proper job (For details see Caglar, 1994; Ozcan and Caglar, 1994; Icelli, 1977, 1987). In addition, and as previously noted, some incapable people who are not "strong enough" in terms of personal qualifications are recruited. Another important factor, which continues to lead individual officers into corruption, is the destruction of moral ethics in Turkey since 1983. When the Prime Minister who came to power after MCA right-wing upheaval was asked about the low level of public servants' income in a press conference in 1984 he made the following speech: "*My public officer knows his/her business (benim memurum isini bilir)*". This meant that public officers know what to do and how to do in order to increase their incomes. Gradually, not only police officers but also almost all public officers became prone to receive bribery from the public who have official business with State institutions. This can be easily seen in public banking systems, customs, taxation institutions, public procurements, etc. (For more information refer to, Radikal; 16/02/2002). The relatively low amount of monthly salary which is earned by ordinary police officers in such an ethics challenged structure, "push" police officers easily into corruption. The style is now of an individual police corruption and not the reality of a mixture of types of corruption. Almost all of them have only their salary as income. Their wives traditionally are in a housewife role and are not working. In brief, all of these conditions and processes, individually and/or in combinations, whatever their nexus, make the Turkish police corruption process and culture much easier.

It is possible to state that officer-based corruption is widespread and can take various forms, depending upon the policing activity involved. In addition, it is possible to observe it in two different ways:

- one, is getting advantages for him/herself and
- the second is to provide advantages to some people.

For example, to benefit oneself at the end of a policing action, and to create some advantages on behalf of the people whom they personally know or the people with whom they have the same political background that the officer has. The second scenario can be considered to be a product of feudal social relationships.

Individually-based corruption, the most common form of bribery, includes not only monetary gratuities, free meals, transportation, and small amounts of gift shopping. Buying goods or services at discounted prices, providing information from police databases, fining a driver and failing to give the traffic offender a ticket and issuing a document to an unauthorized person, and personal use of service cars are also the most common types of policing corruption in Turkey (Fric and Walek, 2001:64). In very simplistic terms bribery occurs in two ways: Demanding bribes and being offered bribes. The first one is done by police officers whereas citizens do the second. However, this study's interviews and press reviews documented that the bribery or taking any kind of presents from citizens who have some type of policing issues is more common among the traffic and police stations' officers. For example, a recent national research study conducted throughout Turkey with business people documented that 53 percent of the sample said that they gave bribes to traffic police officers, and 33 percent of them said that they gave bribes to other police officers who have different ranks (Hurriyet, 15/02/2002; Radikal, 16/02/2002). In addition, those officers who "control" an alcohol-serving restaurant or a hotel in which prostitutes work are also involved with bribery. These corruptions represent facilitating the job's completion or not "seeing" visible irregularities. The interview done with different ranking police officers documented that there is a slang language (jargon words) that is used by police officers to point out the bribery being done. Examples of these words are:

1. The words referring to—bribery—the act: Money or any kinds of presents taken by officers from the citizens who have policing issues: Beard (*sakal*), beard money (*sakal parasi*), soup money (*corba parasi*).
2. The words referring to the officers who take bribery—the bribed: To cleave (*satirlama*), butcher (*kasap*), and cutting the head (*kelle koparma*). These words refer to the establishment of a system for bribery. For example, being said that he is a good cleaver, he is a butcher, or he is a good head cutter means that these officers have a very professional way of getting bribery.
3. The word refers to the person who gives bribery—the briber: A person who gives any kind of presents or pays for the expenses of police officers is named as ox (*okuz*). This person is seen as a kind of sponsor. It is specifically stated that the word does not have an insulting meaning. It just points to the carrying all loads. "Oxes" are the people who need the police tolerances when performing their occupations. For example, owners of discos, bars, gambling places (casinos), and some hotels in which prostitutes stay and perform.



Citizens who bribe are those people who have some business or transactions with the police. To complete his/her job soon(er), or to perform his/her job without police interference, or not to be issued with a ticket are the most common reasons for bribery. In such kinds of corruption, police officers sometimes demand bribery and sometimes citizens propose bribery. In the first, the following communication is mostly used: "See me to see you,"<sup>10</sup> "hey father give us a soup money", "where is my beard money?" etc. In addition, interviews provided the following data: Some police officers who are mostly police stations administrators tell people who visit the police station for their business that "you know we are lacking finance as an organization. Some of our windows are broken and we need to repair them", or "we need to paint the station", or "we have to buy some tires for the patrol car, put some money in to this box, or could you buy it for us", etc. According to the data gathered from the interviews, some amount of money is used for the declared purpose. However, some officers use this money for their personal needs. They sometimes share this bribery money with their colleagues. This way of bribery may be categorized as being an *indirect corruption*. Although taking bribery is an unethical event in the Turkish culture, according to those who demand money, there is nothing wrong with demanding money for a police station's need. A form of noble cause corruption! They think that the police station is a public institution, and asking the public-at-large for support is very normal. In fact, this can be accepted as a way of justification to have peace in mind regarding the case. In addition, those people who give such money don't have any doubt about doing so and none of them make a complaint about this as if it were a case of bribery. As a result, officers save their good images in the public's eye, create non-dangerous ways for promoting bribery and justify their action in their own mind as "*actually we raise this money for the needs of the station*". On the other hand, those people who actually gave bribe money do not generally impute negative meanings about their action. They even feel good for making a "charity". In the end,—and in a culture of corruption also at the very beginning—both sides are happy with the action. These officers are also called: *cleaver, butcher, and head cutter*.

In the second scenario, citizens propose bribery in order to be free from possible charges or to complete ones business with the police sooner. These can and do happen in different ways: For example, putting an amount of money into the officer's pocket, putting money between the pages of ones car license book in the case of traffic control or violating rules, or simply giving the police officer a present. The data gathered documented that the most common individual based-bribery or police corruption, is manifested in the above noted forms. However, if the decreased number of cases publicized in media is considered it is possible to note that the amount of bribery has decreased in recent years. The effect of Turkey's mass media is very important with regard to corruption. The press publishes and radios and TVs broadcast even a relatively small case of bribery or corruption. When such an event is exposed and publicized, the police organization exercises its adjudication process and does utilize some of its available inner disciplinary actions thorough its Inspection Department against law-violating officers. If the court finds an officer guilty and jails her/him, the Organization terminates her/his work and dismisses her/him. According to the punishment given, his/her status as officer changes. The decision is taken according to respective legal procedure and by the entitled authorities (Court and Inspection Department).

The verdict may result in the ban of upgrading for a certain period, not being paid for a few months, being jailed, or dismissal of officer from her/his job. The number of police officers punished since 1990 are noted in Table 16.1. However, the researcher could not obtain the data regarding the number of tried officers from the Organization. It is possible to say that the number of tried officers is much higher than the punished officers.

Table 16.1: Punished Police Personnel by Years

Years	Police Personnel Number in Total	Punished Officers	
		No	%
1990	87160	588	0.7
1991	92120	587	0.6
1992	96853	510	0.5
1993	107164	623	0.6
1994	116162	184	0.2

Source: The Publications of General Directorate of Security.

These figures can be accepted as being normal for such a big Organization given that it is not easy to control every single person of a centralized organization with 172,530 staff. However, it should not be forgotten that they reflect the cases of serious violations that cannot be tolerated, underestimated, ignored or hidden in any condition. The real number of violations is unfortunately much higher than these figures.<sup>11</sup> Despite all efforts, the researcher was not given the data of years between 1995 and 2001. However, Bora (2001) states that, although the total number of court cases regarding law violations of police officers in Turkey between 1995-2001 was 3,428, very few of them were adjudicated by courts. The court procedure takes years and years, and most of the time the case is dropped entirely, and almost none of the accused police-offenders get punished. This event de-moralizes the Turkish public. People have lost their confidence in Turkey's justice and judicial procedure, and do not turn to the court in the cases involving violations and crimes committed by police officers. Although cases are issued many times by some media people, there is not any important improvement on the process. It is not common to see any action or critics against Police and Army in Turkey. Besides that, people accept, in general, the State as a holy structure (*the State is holy*). The police are one of the main organizations of the State. Being against police does somehow mean being against the State. All these make the continuation of this process possible.

### Conclusions and Future Perspectives

It is a truism that "police" constitute the most critical and perhaps the most powerful subsystem in the enforcement and adjudication of the law. In addition the police is one of the major political institutions which enacts the will of the State, and the governments' will in particular, and sometimes their own organizational interests, for and against in society (Carter and Marenin, 1980:259). They "*constitute one particu-*



larly important kind of enforcement agency, that which is typically most visible to citizens, has the largest personnel and is entrusted with the most general range of criminal law enforcement" (Cotterrell, cited by Caglar, 1994). They have more direct and closer relations with the public than the other members of governmental institutions or organizations. They assume critical duties and crucial administrative tasks in daily social life. A police officer in a police department is basic to the system of law enforcement in use in any country today, regardless of the political system and bureaucratic structure. As Regoli and Jerome (cited by Caglar 1994) state, no other occupational group whose members' education and training are as limited is granted similar latitude and discretion in dealing with the lives and welfare of people. Their duty or position also allows them to exercise a strong control and power over the people in society. These realities inevitably direct our attention to *policing style* and make it very important. That's why, "no matter what form it takes, corruption inside the police force poses one of the gravest dangers to the democratic functioning of society" (Fric and Walek, 2001:6). In general, the police are expected to be the ones who provide and maintain social order and peace, and which protect citizens from those who ignore and violate law and public order. In addition to these law breakers, police officers themselves can and do sometimes violate laws and cause many problems such as the public's losing faith in the police organization, rule of law and justice, and, at the times, even in the political system. In such cases, it will be very difficult to regain public confidence and to establish a democratic system.

Actually, each profession has an important role and function for a smooth social life. However, policing is much more important for a peaceful social life. In other words, if one does not have any child who attends school, the quality and success of the teaching profession do not directly interest him/her. If one is not sick, the quality and success of doctors do not directly interest him/her. But the success and quality of the policing profession should surely interest every one, even if s/he stays at home. This is so because, as a citizen, everybody is in need of policing anywhere and anytime in one's life. When one gets out of his/her house, the relationship between individual citizen and police officers is even more visible. Police officers are there, everywhere, at anytime in order to police. As a citizen, each one of us has to take into account the rules that police enforce or which they are mandated to enforce. This means that *policing* is an integral part of each citizens' life. Its importance cannot and should not be underestimated.

From this perspective, if we direct our attention to the policing in Turkey, the following evaluation can be done: The Republic of Turkey has a political system, which is hard to define, but is usually labeled as liberal democracy. It is an incongruous mixture of many elements gleaned idiosyncratically from diverse sources. It is governed under the 1982 Constitution, which was enacted during Turkey's Military Coup. Its articles provide the most appropriate springboard for any discussion of the legislative context of policing and public order. The Constitution is, among other things, a measure against which the laws of the State have to be judged. It also contains the basic rights that Turkey, as a democratic State, is bound to defend. The various articles prevent any citizen being deprived of his/her liberty except in accordance with the law and no one can be on criminally charged except in due course of law. That is, the due process mainly exists in judiciary. Although the Constitution goes some way towards

protecting the individual citizen's liberty, it does provide for restrictions on that liberty in the interests of the common good and in particular when the security of the State is deemed to be under threat. Because of these features, the Turkish Constitution is named as "*But Constitution*" (*Ama Anayasasi*). In other words, the Constitution provides all kinds of rights to Turkish citizens that the modern democracies have, in its first sentences. The second sentences start with the word *but* and it includes the restriction which would be applied in the honoring or abrogation of these rights. That's why, Turkish intellectuals label it as a *But Constitution*. The restrictions on the use of rights lead to minimum input for participation from the public, which is *sine qua non* for a democratic system. Therefore, the first step to establish a more democratic policing in Turkey in particular and a more democratic Turkish society in general, is to make the Constitution a more democratic one that allows more input from its citizenry and which is based on human rights and equality. The present government has made some efforts to make these changes recently. For example, male and females are addressed to be equal in all aspects of life. The verdicts of Europe Human Rights Court are accepted. If the Court's verdict is a compensation for a torture case, the accused police officer has to pay. Police Schools (with only 9 months education and training) are closed and new Police Vocational High Schools (with 2 full academic year education and training) replaced them.

Recently, a succession of statements and recommendations has been made by social scientists, intellectuals and politicians concerning the need of a fundamental restructuring of the police, on torturing and human rights violations in particular. It is possible to say that the wish to join the European Union and public awareness of democratic values and human rights played a very important role on these developments. This restructuring is to be achieved through democratization of the organization and police practices and by more input from Turkish citizenry. It is also argued that the re-conceptualization of the *police as a service* and the re-designation of the *community as customers* will make the police more responsive (Caglar, 2001). It is not exactly clear how these debates will be resolved but it is clear that a re-conceptualization and restructuring of policing is on the agenda, although the terrorist activities in the country makes such an effort difficult. In fact these changes can be achieved through organizational structure which will ensure prioritization of public (customer) needs, enhanced professionalism, a re-distribution and re-design of police duties (police work), and public opinion surveys. As a consequence, it is hoped that the traditional consensual relationship between the police and public will be re-established; direct local accountability of the police will be strengthened and prejudgments and stereotypes about the police will mostly be eradicated. As a result, corruption in policing in Turkey can be minimized.

The economic reforms, beginning in January 1980, designed to privatize the Turkish economy, and the political reforms, since October 1991, aimed to modernize and rationalize the Turkish Justice System and the Criminal Law. These have promoted a renewed emphasis on social order and police-public relationships. The Ministry of Justice and Ministry for Internal Affairs expected the police to emerge from this policy change as upholders of new legal codes, and act in a non-political and scientific-objective manner. Reflecting this, a number of new legal codes have now focused on the role of the police in the detention and investigation of offenders. For example, to extend the border of freedom of expression, to limit the detention days of a suspected



person in custody (with four days), etc. The respective legislation is done in the first quarter of the year 2002 by changing "Press Law" and related articles of the Police Duty and Authority Law. So far the new economic, social and political policies continue. In addition, the education and training period for ordinary police officers, which was only for a period of 9 months, was increased to two academic years with the enactment of the new Law, 4652 and on 25/04/2001. It is likely that for many years to come that the predominant public impression of the individual police officers is likely to be that of someone associated with authority and the State rather than one who wears the badge of a separate and neutral body.

Turkey is ranked as one of the world's most corrupt countries.<sup>12</sup> It would be difficult to find an adult in today's Turkey who has never in his/her life given a bribe to a public official. A huge and ineffective bureaucracy forces people into bribing. A lifestyle, climate and culture exists in which bribery is accepted as being the only way to solve official business-related problems. As a consequence of this reality, people have gotten accustomed to the bribery process. They tolerate and accept bribing as a normal way of business with public servants and in this process foster and even reinforce it. Ironically, with the institutionalization and the normalizing of bribery, an exposition of a corruption act is generally seen as being an attack on the *dignity of the State*.

At this stage, it is useful and necessary to ask the question: "*Can we build a non-corrupt police force?*" The answer to such a question in Turkey's present conditions would definitely be "*No*."

- Firstly, it is impossible to end corruption completely in such large organizations.
- Secondly, wherever power and authority exist, there are also opportunities and some of the necessary conditions and ways to corrupt or to see corruption behaviors.

As has been said: "*power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely*". If someone has no power, it means he has nothing to corrupt. The important thing is to minimize the level of corruption in order not to affect the general processing of policing in a negative way. The rule of law and justice is essential. The decrease in the credibility of both the police and the judicial system will increase the spread of corruption which can, and does, lead to the destruction of democratic institutions.

The following measures are being suggested as necessary interventions which are designed to minimize policing and police corruption—individual and systemic/organizational varieties— in Turkey in the future:

1. The first and most important step is to acknowledge that corruption in Turkey's policing and police organization is a problem. The reform initiated within Turkey's police organization must be expanded and completed. The present perception about and the approach by police administrators towards police corruption must be changed. The needed facilities and measurements to control such corruption should be developed. A police organization can invest billions of dollars in technology to improve its intelligence gathering system or to make it more efficient. However, if it has easily corrupted police officers, this investment will mean nothing. The first and most important tool of good and democratic policing is having job-dedicated staff. To achieve this, objective recruitment based on merit and ability has to be implemented and maintained. Firstly, the advantages and privileges given to the people who are considered and covered by Law 2330 should be abolished. This

means that the people who do not have the necessary and proper qualifications to be effective police officers should not be recruited and should not be accepted as students in police educational institutions. Secondly, every single candidate should be appropriately investigated by professionals in terms of relevant background and personal qualities. Additionally, s/he should undergo both psychological and psychiatric tests which are designed, and have proven their merit, for determining his/her mental and personal characteristics and also weak points, or vulnerabilities. For example, the vulnerability to be corrupted or to corrupt others. As a result of screening, it should be possible to select the most appropriate candidates among applicants, acknowledging that human error can and does play a role. Clear and effective recruitment selection criteria within an appropriate selection process will definitely increase the level of police professionalism. This can be achieved by proper "*education strengthened by fair competition*". Such professionalism can also improve the sense and level of responsibility that both individuals and society should have. A high and reality-based sense of responsibility and dignity will help people to protect their own rights, which will lead to needed transparency both in the policing system and in the State. A rational and responsible police officer, of whatever rank and task and who is fundamental for any democratic model, is the person acting with understanding and professionalism.

- An objective, fair appointment and promotion system, which is based on merit and qualification, must be implemented in the Police Organization. Nobody should have any kind of privileges. The power and authority of "seniors" over "subordinates" have to be in accordance with the law and a relevant code of conduct. This is more than likely to increase the level of belief and dedication to one's job and motivate police officers; a process which will consequently lead to a more democratic, professional and non-corrupt police force.
2. Another most important and necessary process for minimizing police corruption is to design training and education which will increase the level and quality of both police recruits as well as veteran officers. A work—requirement—focused curriculum and training program, which is based on human rights and equality and teaches policing as a service to public, should be planned, "dry-run", assessed, and implemented. The importance of policing to all of Turkey's society should be emphasized during both the recruiting and experienced police officer education and training. Furthermore, a good policing image should be taught to officers. Unprofessional behaviors should always be condemned in order to make the difference between "good" and "bad" police images abundantly clear. Police officers should routinely be informed about criminal acts committed by their colleagues and the action been taken against them. Such activities should be repeated through an ongoing in-service training program which is structured to facilitate and to promote built-in assessment and ongoing needed changes.
    - In addition, police officer's intentional deviant and criminal behaviors should be punished more "heavily" than those done by an ordinary citizen. Police, as an organization, should never tolerate criminal acts by *any* police. The corrupted or corrupting officer should immediately be dismissed from his/her job, and the police organization should be very sensitive and consistent as



regards to these issues. In other words, every single officer must know that his/her unlawful behavior will be punished "hard," "tough," and immediately and that the organization will not tolerate this kind of behavior.

- The introduction of an independent monitoring and controlling body which is independent of the police organization and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will help to decrease the number of law violating cases committed by police officers. For example, Turkey should have an independent Police Complaint Bureau; because, the idea of democratic policing requires a more accountable police force (For details see Loveday, 1999:132-150).
- 3. Moreover, police officers should be frightened about losing his/her job. This means, first of all, that the job should be a kind of *favored, preferred and/or status one*. The provision of proper work conditions and a salary level that compares to similar occupations can help to achieve this. Turkey's present income level does not satisfy police officers. They stated that they work in a world of hostility. They analyze the job they have to do and compare with the salary they get, and say, "I cannot do more than I do for this money. Who will take care of my wife and kids, if anything happens to me?" This kind of thinking is quite common among ordinary police officers. The response to this frustration is accepting policing as "just a job" to be done without enjoying it. This definitely affects job performance and success.
  - In addition, a police officer should not be kept in the same district, or working area in metropolitan cities, for more than two years. This is designed to prevent him/her from making contact with and being contacted by possible "illegal" people (deviants and criminals) and those from organized crime in particular. The members of acting police teams in the area should be replaced one at a time.
  - Corruption does not only take place in selected countries. It is a potential problem for all contemporary societies, no matter what their political system is not their status (developed, developing, in transition, etc.). This shows us the importance of a strong and capable international police body such as *Interpol* or *Transparency International*, to create the necessary cooperation between police organizations in order to exchange information on cases of corruption and taking anti-corruption measurements in different police organization.
- 4. Anti-corruption policies have to be considered and implemented very carefully by both political and organizational authorities for their effectiveness. Cheap, quick and short-term or daily policies and measurements will never work. Instead, a long-term, consistent anti-corruption policy and strategy should be implemented. Although administrative and disciplinary measurements are very important, police officers should also know that they would be prosecuted for their corrupt (deviant) actions. Authorities should pay more attention to personnel in key positions and the potential "personnel-at-risk." The concept of "vulnerability" is well known one in many spheres for which screening and monitoring are an integral part of systems.
- 5. Mass media can make a valuable and needed contribution to the effective remedies of corruption-combating policies and strategies by exposing corrupt officers

and thereby facilitating their punishment. The media can also provide an open discussion forum for exposing and criticizing cases of police corruption in order to facilitate greater and appropriate citizen involvement and creating anti-corruption as the "norm", rather than its opposite. This "right" should be anchored in Turkey's Constitution. However, the media should not be committed to the agents of particular interest groups or people in power. An independent, socially responsive media is a necessary ever present fourth force of democracy.

- 6. NGOs should be supported and encouraged to:
  - fight against all kinds of corruption in society;
  - give protection and legal assistance to the victims of corruption;
  - organize conferences and give seminars to inform both the public and police officers about the issues, consequences, and options;
  - produce handouts, bulletins for informing and educating the public;
  - encourage and support public to apply for judicial procedure in any case of corruption;
  - raise and increase the public awareness about corruption, its causes, and costs;
  - help the public not to underestimate and ignore corrupt acts.

Without a strong engagement from the public and civil institutions (society), it will be very difficult to control corruption. On the other hand, existence of a strong civil society is one of main requirements for a democratic society. It helps to create free individuals who are aware of events and who are sufficiently capable to organize themselves and to protect their own rights and interests against corruption. The active, ongoing involvement of non-governmental, democratic-civil institutions is needed in order to help, create and maintain a democratic process in society. For example, fair control over lobbying and democratic models of cooperation and balancing over and between executive, bureaucratic, legislative, and judicial branches of a State will definitely minimize the level of corruption.

- An effective and professional level of supervision would also help to combat corruption in policing. Fair, objective, and supportive supervision can regulate evaluation and feed-back meetings in the police department. It can also organize necessary ongoing in-service training in order to inform police officers about the policing and security expectations of the public and to encourage and increase the level of transparency, integrity, responsibility, and rule of law in the organization as much as is possible. In addition, the level of discretion used by any individual officer needs to be clearly defined and to be in accordance with the code of police conduct. Furthermore, a definitive job description and a clearly defined work procedure should be prepared as a basic police document and distributed to all police officers. This document should also include a clear and enforceable definition of punishment of law-violated acts. Professional, successful police officers and those who identify corruption cases should be rewarded.

In summary, as previously noted, in order to decrease the level of police corruption—as well as corruption in general—in a given society, a transparent democratic



system of governance is a must. A democratic society means equality, justice, human rights, good governance, and transparency for individuals and systems. The government has to have a strong will for a fair, transparent, and democratic governance. Secondly, it is necessary to research both reasons (parameters and processes) and the results (outcomes) of corruption, and to develop measurable, theoretically-based and/or evidence-based intervention tactics, policies, and strategies. Lastly, one needs to publicize the relevant information (including the successes, the failures, and the irrelevant interventions as well as 'boomerang' effects) and to enforce (implement) the regulations. It is posited that the most important step is to be consistent in taking action against *all kinds of corruption*, regardless of the institutions and people who actually are, or who may be potentially involved, being guided by safeguards such as "due process". This will serve two significant and basic objectives:

- Firstly, all people, systems and institutions who are involved or who can be involved will have the opportunity to "step back". Corruption doesn't necessarily lead to myopia or blindness!
- Secondly, general public opinion regarding combatting corruption is likely to create needed confidence in politicians, governors, and, consequently, within and for the State and society. When corruption is wide spread in a democracy, the general public can and does easily discredit the *idea of democracy* itself, instead of blaming unsuccessful politicians. Notwithstanding the inherent dangers of over simplicity, it would appear that "ordinary people" – however defined or stereotyped- rarely, if ever, bother to explore and to better understand and analyze the "problems", their parameters, and their inter-relationships. Instead, they -WE- always seem to need someone (else) or something to blame for their- OUR- sufferings.

Ali Caglar (Ph.D.) (Turkey), is Associate Professor of Sociology, Hacettepe University, Department of Public Administration, Ankara, Turkey. He got his Ph.D. from Department of Sociology, University of Surrey, UK, in 1994. His Dissertation title was "Recruitment, Occupational Consciousness and Professionalism in the Turkish Police". He has been working on policing, Turkish Police in particular, since 1989. He has papers presented in different Symposia and published in different journals and books on Police, Policing, Terror and Terror Organizations. He served as member of Administrative Board of Turkish Sociological Association from 1997 to 2001. He is currently one of three editors of *Journal of Sociological Research*, Turkish Sociological Association's official publication. He is also a member of International Steering Committee of International Review *Crossing the Thin Blue Line*, 2002 Edition. He has been on leave from his university and working as Regional International Trainer, Election Department, in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo (OMIK).



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## Glossary

**Individual based corruption:** The corruption which occurs as an outcome of police officer's unprofessional policing conduct such as taking bribes, not ticketing a rule-violated driver, misusing his/her personal authority for a personal gain. The actor of corruption is the police officer him/herself.

**Organizational based corruption:** The corruption originated from the organizational structure of a police force such as misuse and different applications of administrative authority in recruitment, appointment and promotion, arbitrary decisions of seniors, lack of professional training and education of police officers, not having a consistent and professional disciplinary mechanism, etc. That is, organizational structure itself leads to corruption.

**Words referring to bribery:** Money or any kinds of presents taken by officers from the citizens who have policing issues: Beard (*sakal*), beard money (*sakal parasi*), soup money (*corba parasi*).

**Words referring to the officers who take bribery:** To cleave (*satirlama*), butcher (*kasap*), and cutting the head (*kelle koparma*). These words refer to the establishment of a system for bribery. For example, being said that *he is a good cleaver*, *he is a butcher*, or *he is a good head cutter* means that these officers have a very professional way of getting bribery.

**Ox (*okuz*):** refers to the person who gives bribery, any kind of present or pays for the expenses of police officers. This person is seen as a kind of sponsor. It is specifically stated that the word does not have an insulting meaning. It just points to the carrying of loads. "Oxes" are the people who need the police's "tolerance" when performing their occupations. For example, owners of discos, bars, gambling places (casinos) and some hotels in which prostitutes stay and perform.

## Notes

- 1 Although there are women military officers who graduated from Military Academies in the army, Turkish women do not have a military service as men have.
- 2 The director is being appointed by the government through Minister of Internal Affairs among the Organization staff who fulfill criteria, which are to have the 1<sup>st</sup> degree of Security Director rank, a good professional background, etc.
- 3 It is also accountable to the General Presidency of the Turkish Army (The Chief of General Staff). The Army has a unique position, which is not under the total control and authority of the government.
- 4 Police Vocational High Schools were established by Law, numbered 4652, in year 2001. They started their education program in 2001/2002 Academic Year.
- 5 The Board is composed of five members at least. Members are: One four-star Security Director who is generally the Director of the School where the exam takes place, one Personnel Office staff, being charged and sent by GDS from Ankara, and three Commissars—head, commissar and assistant commissar ranks—from the local offices. If any GDS staff who is psychologist is available, this staff also can be asked to be a member of the board. The Board is named as Examination Board. The four-star Security Director, who is the highest rank in the Board, chairs it. Members of commissions may be changed for the next examination period, but they again have to be GDS's staff. Theoretically, all members have one



- vote and are equal on making decision. However, the highest rank may informally overrule the others because of the hierarchical structure of the Organization.
- 6 It is a recently constructed cell-style prison.
  - 7 This research was done by a four-star police director. A four-star rank is the top rank in the Police Organization, being just under the General Director who is the only five-star rank police officer.
  - 8 On 12 September 1980, the Turkish Army under the command of Chief of Staff, made a military Coup against the government; banned all political parties, closed the General Assembly, and took over power completely. After creating and passing a new Constitution in 1982, the country returned back to democratic system by free election in 1983.
  - 9 In the regions under the extra-ordinary administration because of terrorist activities such as Diyarbakir, Tunceli provinces, etc., the detention period in police stations changes. However, it is four days at most in ordinary cases according to the change made in 2002. The arrested person has to be either freed or sent to the respective court at the end of the fourth day.
  - 10 It has a figurative meaning. It means, "if you give me some money (present, etc.) I will not police you".
  - 11 For some ordinary cases see *Radikal* (13/12/1996:8; 12/7/2000:5, 8; 14/7/2000:24; 15/7/2000:7; 22/7/2000:7; 23/9/2000:9; 16/12/2000:1,7; 17/12/2000:3,7; 16/1/2001:6; 20/3/2001:5; 12/4/2001:6; 5/6/2001:4; 24/6/2001); *Milliyet*, (30/7/1995:12; 2/7/1995:12; 12/4/2001:15; 21/4/2001:1,16; 14/3/2002); *Hurriyet*, (9/5/2001; 30/6/2001).
  - 12 For detailed information see, <http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng>, <http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org>, *Radikal*, 16/02/2002 and *Hurriyet*, 16/02/2002.

## 17 A Korean Way of Controlling Police Corruption – Operation Grand Reform

Chang Won Pyo Ph.D.

### Abstract

*This paper reviews selected parameters, processes and conditions associated with individual, systemic and organizational police corruption, such as definitions, actual and posited causes, characteristics, impacts, and measures of police corruption. It relates these to Korean Police corruption, past and present, and the most recent "Operation Grand Reform" which was designed to effectively intervene.*

*There has been serious criticism that Korean police system is too centralized, bureaucratic and hierarchical. While it is lacking effective monitoring by an elected democratic body or outside observers, the police in Korea are under the control and influences of more powerful authorities such as Prosecution Authority, National Intelligence Service and Presidential Security Service. Police sub-culture such as secrecy and authoritarianism, as well as the wide-spread problem of corruption in the wider society of Korea, has also been blamed to be working as fertilizer for corruption.*

*Alarmed by the economic crisis of the late 1990s, Korean society realized that the problem of corruption should be addressed. In the field of Police, "Operation Grand Reform" aimed to change everything but good and positive tradition was the measure chosen by the ambitious Commissioner General.*

**Key Words:** police corruption, police culture, police malpractice, socialization of corruption, police malpractice

### Theoretical Review

#### 1. Definition of "Police Corruption"

The dictionary definition of 'corruption' is "the perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). While Ward explains police corruption as "the misuse of police authority to enforce the law or provide other police service impartially; the protection of illicit activities from police enforcement; and the police employee's involvement in promoting the business of one person while discouraging that of another person, whether or not the police employee receives something of value in return" (Ward, 1975: p. 34), Misner attaches much importance to motivation, saying that if friendship - not the office - was the actual motivation of the gift-giving, then the behavior would not constitute corruption (Misner, 1975: p. 27). Another form of corruption is that State personnel take advantage of their position in order to create a way for other persons to obtain illegal gain, and then these State personnel take bribes or extort interest from them (Xie Baoguo, 1988: p. 23).